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Neodevelopmentalism has become Argentina’s hegemonic development project after 
neoliberalism. While it has been able to bring back economic growth, the development of its 
inner contradictions is creating growing barriers to the possibility of further expansion within 
the same project of development, particularly as the world economy enters into crisis. I analyze 
the constitution of the hegemonic project and the main barriers it faces.
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1. Introduction
After the crisis of the neoliberal project (1998-2001) and the violent transition following it (2001-
2002), capitalism in Argentina seems to have regained coherence, and dominant classes seem to 
have renewed their confidence in the “thesis of impossibility” regarding economic crisis.1 A 
historically exceptional process of strong economic growth since 2002 has led many analysts to 
believe that, no matter what happens at an international level, Argentina is protected against all 
odds.2 The local impact of the first wave of capitalist crisis in the core capitalist countries (2007-
2008) was in fact mild: growth stalled in 2009 but recovery was fast. The most recent downturn 
1Departamento de Sociología, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, Universidad Nacional de La 
Plata and Centro de Investigaciones Geográficas del Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales 
(CIG-IdIHCS), Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas and Universidad Nacional de La Plata 
(CONICET-UNLP), La Plata, Argentina
Date received: August 12, 2012 
Date accepted: May 5, 2013
Corresponding Author:
Mariano Féliz, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Avenida 7 no. 1386 (entre 61 y plaza Rocha), departamento B, La 
Plata, 1900, Argentina. 
Email: marianfeliz@gmail.com
518729 RRPXXX10.1177/0486613413518729Review of Radical Political EconomicsFéliz
research-article2014
1During the 1990s, Argentinean dominant classes and their theoretical representatives (neoclassical econo-
mists) were sure that a generalized crisis was impossible (see Naszewski 1996). At the most, as deflation 
and recession became evident after 1998, they believed that slight adjustments might have to be made.
2GDP growth between 2002 and 2012 averaged 7.6 percent (see Table 1, column 2), the highest rhythm on 
record. According to IMF estimates, the world’s GDP growth averaged 5 percent in the period.
 by guest on February 6, 2015rrp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Féliz 71
in capitalism at the center (2010-2012) has begun to impact on exports and industrial production 
but in mid-2012, while capitalist growth slowed down significantly, overt crisis (e.g. uncon-
trolled capital devaluation) does not appear on the horizon.
However, this process is not without problems. Contradictions, barriers, and even limits to the 
hegemonic capitalist development project in Argentina are mounting: inflation remains high and 
steady, wages have stagnated in real terms, and twin fiscal and external surpluses keep deteriorat-
ing. Structural limits of Argentina’s capitalist structure seem to be ever more present: dependency 
on primary exports and limited potential for “re-industrialization,” manufacturing competitive-
ness based on super-exploitation of labor and nature, and regressive income distribution.
In this paper, I study the development of contradictions, barriers, and limits in Argentina’s 
new post-neoliberal hegemonic project: neodevelopmentalism. In the following section, I will 
briefly describe the constitution and basic foundations of this new process. I will show how 
neodevelopmentalism has worked as an attempt by dominant fractions of capital to take advan-
tage of the neoliberal legacy and to surpass its limitations. Later on, I present the basic contrac-
tions and barriers of this new project as they manifest themselves as forms of class struggle. 
Moreover, I will discuss how neodevelopmentalism in Argentina manages the impact of the first 
crisis in world capitalism in the 21st century. Finally I present some conclusions.
2. The Political Economy of Neodevelopmentalism in Argentina
In line with recent changes in South America, in 2002 Argentina jumped from neoliberal rule into 
a new form of capitalist development in the periphery: neodevelopmentalism (Thwaites Rey 
2010; Leiva 2008; Féliz 2012).3
Ever since its inception, neodevelopmentalism (ND) has been a project of the dominant 
classes to regain an expansive path of capitalist development after years of instability, stagnation, 
and recurrent crisis (Féliz and Pérez 2004). Through almost three decades of struggle, foreign 
and local corporations of transnational scope were able to gain hegemonic control within the 
local capitalist class, leaving small- and medium-sized national capitals in a subordinate posi-
tion.4 From 2002 onwards, their aim has been to capitalize structural transformations produced 
during the neoliberal restructuration (1975-2001) while at the same time containing and disarm-
ing the popular upheaval that had turned the (economic) crisis of the neoliberal Plan de 
Convertibilidad (1991-2001), in Gramscian words, into an organic crisis of Argentinian capital-
ism (Féliz and López 2012).5
3While there are similarities between the national post-neoliberal projects in South America, there are also 
marked differences. In a nutshell, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have followed a more radical path of 
transformation (with evident limits but, arguably, in a post-capitalist direction); the founding members of 
the Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay) have shown greater continuities with the previous 
capitalist development path but also significant political and policy changes; while Chile, Peru, and 
Colombia are showing a much more clear neoliberal line of continuity.
4The hegemony of small and medium national capitalists was the objective base for the historical national-
popular project (NPP) of capitalism in the periphery, especially in the so-called import-substitution (devel-
opmentalist) period between the 1940s and the early 1970s. After neoliberalism, the displacement of this 
national bourgeoisie from the objective control of the process of valorization and accumulation of capital 
seems to have made the NPP into a project without class, that is, without its leading subject, the national 
bourgeoisie (Féliz 2013).
5The Plan de Convertibilidad (Convertibility Plan) was the expression, in Argentina, of the Washington 
Consensus during the nineties. After the monetarist approach in the 1970s and the heterodox approaches in 
the 1980s, the Convertibility Plan acted as the latest tactical device to advance neoliberal capitalist restruc-
turation. This program included the convertibility of the local currency (peso) to the dollar, the privatization 
of most public enterprises, the deregulation of the economy (particularly the labor market), and the opening 
up of the current account. See Basualdo (2006).
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For this reason, I do not understand neodevelopmentalism in Argentina as just a new “economic 
model,” as many researchers suggest (for example, Curia 2007). ND is a sociopolitical project of 
the new ruling classes (transnationalized capital) with the objective of constituting a new stable, 
controlled pattern of capitalist development meant to replace the growingly unsustainable neolib-
eral strategy. In the case of Argentina, the objective of ND has been to take the social bases created 
by neoliberal structural reforms (inspired – in the nineties – by the Washington Consensus) and 
channel the productive forces thus available toward a new phase of successful valorization and 
accumulation of capital. In a sense, ND might be understood as the sociopolitical strategy whose 
goal is to conform to a new “social structure of accumulation” (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1994).
The structural bases for the articulation of this new development strategy were created through 
neoliberalism and include the ample centralization, concentration, and transnationalization of 
capital; the structural precariousness and political decomposition of the labor-force; and the con-
solidation of a new set of market-based socio-economic regulations, amongst other elements that 
became the legacy of the neoliberal period. First, the neoliberal rule in Argentina gave place to 
the transnationalization of capital in its financial, commercial, and productive forms. Total for-
eign debt grew to 146 billion in 2000 (in contrast with 27 billion in 1980; Kulfas and Schorr 
2003), foreign trade increased to 25.3 percent of GDP in 2004 (from 7.8 percent in 1975; Ferreres 
2005), and foreign ownership of productive capital went from controlling 33.8 percent of value 
added by big corporations in 1993 to controlling 73.6 percent in 2001.6 Second, productivity of 
labor in industrial manufacturing increased 67.3 percent between 1991 and 2001 (Féliz 2007). 
Finally, transformations in the labor market led to the structural precariousness of the labor-force 
(for example, non-registered wage employment went from 33.4 percent to 43.7 percent of the 
wage labor-force in the private sector between May 1990 and October 2001; Neffa et al. 2010) 
and the reduction in popular income (in 1998 real wages were 16.2 percent lower than in 1988).7
Contrary to the official narrative that asserts that ND is the absolute negation of neoliberalism, 
I understand that the neodevelopmentalist project grew as the dialectical supersession of the 
neoliberal one. This means that it did not obliterate its neoliberal origins but took its legacy as 
new foundations. ND became the necessary alternative for dominant classes to regain their debil-
itated hegemony over society.
Since 1998 the Argentinian economy had been stumbling on a downward movement that 
alternated between stagnation and outright recession (Féliz 2007). After advancing with force in 
the early nineties, neoliberal rule had lost momentum as economic and social contradictions 
turned increasingly difficult to manage (Bonnet 2006; Féliz 2007). The tactical advantage of the 
Convertibility Plan wore off as the barriers that it created manifested as increasingly unmanage-
able conflicts: debt-led growth turned into a debt explosion and fiscal crisis as economic growth 
tumbled (Damill and Frenkel 2003); growing organic composition of capital manifested in defla-
tionary tendencies and falling profitability (Féliz 2011); progressive political re-composition of 
labor that turned pervasive unemployment and job precariousness into increasing social and 
political unrest (Féliz 2011; Bonnet 2006).
Throughout the 1990s, accelerated capital restructuring increased labor productivity, “mod-
ernized” the productive structure (changing the social/technical division of labor/capital), con-
solidated the precariousness of labor as a source of absolute surplus value, and created new 
sources for the formation and appropriation of surplus value based on land rent (especially in 
mining and agribusiness).8 Besides, 30 years of neoliberal rule transformed the political compo-
sition of capital. The national bourgeoisie was completely displaced by locally concentrated 
6Estimates of foreign ownership of capital are based on data from the Encuesta Nacional a Grandes Empresas 
(ENGE, National Survey of Big Enterprises) that includes the biggest 500 non-financial corporations.
7All data presented along the article are my own estimations based on original information provided by 
official statistical offices of Argentina (such as the National Institute of Statistics and the Census (INDEC), 
or the Ministry of Economy), unless noted otherwise.
8On this process, see more in Basualdo (2006), Neffa (1998), Azpiazu and Schorr (2010), and Féliz (2007).
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capitals of transnational tendency (Basualdo 2006). By the mid-nineties, this new hegemonic 
fraction within the capitalist class was ready to lead, and control, Argentina’s capitalist develop-
ment. Within the working class, structural changes led to its political re-composition in the late 
nineties. While formal fractions of the labor-force remained significant (particularly in political 
terms), the more precarious segments of the working people (including the unemployed, autono-
mous workers, and small non-capitalist employers) gained political force, demanding the termi-
nation of never-ending adjustment (Bonnet 2006).
In early 2002, the dominant sectors were able to force changes in public policies to speed up 
the resolution of a crisis that had already been going on for too long and at a growing cost (Féliz 
2007); between 1998 and 2001 GDP had fallen by 8.4 percent, international reserves had decreased 
by 43.2 percent as capital flight reached 11.99 billion dollars in 2001, profitability of big corpora-
tions fell 39.6 percent in real terms, and country risk topped 4,438 points in December 2001.9 
Within this context, as a political strategy, the ND attempted to put to productive use for capital 
the demands of the different sociopolitical actors toward the constitution of a new hegemonic 
project. As an economic strategy, neodevelopmentalism looks forward to put to good use the valo-
rization potential embedded in the new economic structure created through the neoliberal years.
During the first three months of 2002, several steps were taken to opt-out of the Convertibility 
Plan into an unknown but already unavoidable future: (1) abandonment of currency convertibil-
ity and its devaluation, (2) “asymmetric pesoification” of debts and deposits (every dollarized 
bank account and debt was turned into the national currency), (3) part of the dollarized public 
debt was defaulted, (4) dollar-denominated tariffs for privatized services were pesoified and 
remained fixed, (5) public employees’ wages were effectively frozen, and (6) a tax on selected 
primary exports was created.10 These measures were meant to alter basic macroeconomic rela-
tions to create “fairer” terms for capital. They forced the needed devaluation of capital in its dif-
ferent forms (variable and constant, productive and finance, etc.) required to jumpstart valorization 
and accumulation (growth) of capital, allowed for an increase in its profitability (Table 3, column 
2), and the improvement in both external and fiscal balances (Table 1, columns 3-5).
The differential class impact of the initial policy changes was clear. First, currency devalua-
tion and its effect on local prices reduced wage costs (in real and dollar terms) favoring produc-
tive capital against labor. Second, since the “asymmetric pesoification” implied the conversion of 
dollar deposits into pesos at an exchange rate of 1.4 pesos per dollar while most credits were 
converted at a 1 to 1 exchange rate (favoring debtors, particularly exporting companies), the dif-
ferential cost for the banking system was absorbed by the state through the emission of public 
dollarized debt that was handed over to banks and depositors.11 Third, while helped by devalua-
tion, a fraction of exporters (especially those selling soya, wheat, and oil) were heavily taxed 
helping the state recover its revenues. This, together with the freezing of public employees’ 
wages, allowed it to continue paying its non-defaulted debt.
It is important to acknowledge that macroeconomic policy changes did not create the struc-
tural conditions for accumulation but altered value relations and created a new institutional 
framework allowing those conditions to be successfully exploited by dominant fractions of capi-
tal. In fact, increased competitiveness during the nineties (due to higher productivity of labor and 
lowering relative real unit labor costs; Féliz 2007) could not translate into a higher real exchange 
rate and improved profitability without exiting the “corset” of the convertibility. Through cur-
rency devaluation, nominal demand for domestic production was expanded at the same time that 
9Salvia (2012) analyzes the position of dominant fractions of capital through the crisis of the latest stage of 
neoliberalism in Argentina (the convertibility).
10For a detailed account of the transition see Schorr (2005) and Féliz (2012).
11The cost of this decision was eventually borne by tax-payers that (in an intrinsically regressive tax system) 
were the lot of the working class.
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labor costs were reduced further, thus creating demand and cost incentives for renewed growth. At 
the same time, the weight of the web created by debt-led growth together with the impact of the 
convertibility’s highly dollarized local financial system could not be undone through deflation and 
bankruptcies, as neoliberal wisdom expected, without explosive social tensions and political 
havoc. Debt default and restructuring of the financial system was unavoidable for any viable solu-
tion. Public finances could not be corrected in a recessionary context through fiscal crunch.12 
Eventually, the new government found a politically workable solution to the conundrum in real 
wage devaluation (through currency devaluation) and a new tax on growing nominal rents.13
After the crisis of convertibility, the creation of the new export tax, the devaluation of real 
wages for state employees, and the moratorium and renegotiation of public debt turned the public 
deficit into a significant surplus (1.8 percent of GDP as early as 2005). At the same time, a current 
account deficit of 3.2 percent of GDP in 2000 turned into a sizable surplus of 8.4 percent of GDP 
in 2002. This was the combined effect of a reduced share of consumption in GDP and the 
increased competitiveness of exports (Féliz and Pérez 2007). In all, these policies allowed capi-
talist growth to return in the third quarter of 2002 after 17 quarters of falling real GDP.

























1993 n/a -3.5% 2.4% 1.2% 99.6 14173
1994 5.8% -4.3% 1.2% 0.0% 98.0 17114
1995 -2.8% -2.0% 1.1% -0.5% 97.5 13699
1996 5.5% -2.5% -0.3% -2.0% 100.3 19269
1997 8.1% -4.1% 0.5% -1.5% 102.0 26237
1998 3.9% -4.8% 0.9% -1.4% 102.6 30753
1999 -3.4% -4.2% 1.2% -1.7% 106.2 31880
2000 -0.8% -3.2% 1.0% -2.4% 110.8 32243
2001 -4.4% -1.4% 0.5% -3.2% 115.2 24385
2002 -10.9% 8.4% 0.7% -1.5% 287.5 10883
2003 8.8% 6.4% 2.3% 0.5% 250.9 12136
2004 9.0% 2.1% 3.9% 2.6% 243.5 17198
2005 9.2% 2.9% 3.7% 1.8% 219.4 23704
2006 8.5% 3.6% 3.5% 1.8% 215.5 25578
2007 8.7% 2.8% 3.2% 1.1% 189.2 41013
2008 6.8% 2.1% 3.1% 1.4% 157.0 47741
2009 0.9% 3.6% 1.5% -0.6% 160.6 46435
2010 9.2% 0.8% 1.7% 0.2% 139.4 49847
2011 8.9% -0.1% 0.3% -1.7% 132.3 50205
Source: My own elaboration from data provided by the National Institute of Statistics and the Census (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos / INDEC) and the Central Bank of Argentina. n/a: not available.
12In fact, the government of President De la Rúa (December 1999 - December 2001) learned this the painful 
way. Several attempts to contract public expenditure and/or increase taxation, through nominal wage defla-
tion for public employees and tax hikes on traditional tax bases, contributed to deepening recession and to 
heightened political struggles (Salvia 2012).
13Of course, this came at a great cost for the working class. This solution was only one of the alternatives 
discussed at the time, and expressed the political triumph of dominant fractions of capital.
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The other side of these changes was an 18.1 percent reduction in real wages and the 6 percent 
fall in employment in 2002 in comparison with 2001. This was accompanied by an increase in 
poverty rates: in 2002, 52 percent of Argentina’s urban population was statistically income-poor. 
A decade later, economic and social indicators have improved significantly (Table 2). However, 
in general, improvement of social standards has stagnated at the better values of the early nine-
ties, but a long way from the historical marks of the early seventies (Féliz and López 2012; 
Rougier and Schorr 2012; Fernández and González 2011); while in 1974 the participation of 
labor in income reached 49.7 percent, in 2010 it remained at 37.8 percent. In parallel with this, 
income poverty was under the 9 percent rate in 1974 while in 2010 it still included around 25 
percent of the population (ATE-INDEC 2012).
Successful capitalist expansion after 2002 has been led by a combination of innovations in 
macroeconomic and labor policies, designed with the goal of enhancing and maintaining com-
petitiveness of capital. Devalued currency, low real interest rates, and expansive fiscal policy 
were the main components of macroeconomic policy with the aim of guaranteeing economic 
growth (Curia 2007). These policies were combined with a wide array of subsidies to manufac-
turing corporations, a program of public infrastructure, and public debt restructuring, to favor 
sustained economic growth by attempting to provide capital with a secure horizon for 
Table 2. Selected labor market data. Argentina, 1993-2011.























1993 n/a 9.6% 1.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a
1994 4.2% 11.4% -0.7% n/a n/a n/a n/a
1995 3.4% 17.5% -3.1% n/a n/a n/a n/a
1996 0.2% 17.2% 0.6% n/a n/a n/a n/a
1997 0.5% 14.9% 6.2% n/a n/a n/a n/a
1998 0.9% 12.9% 4.0% n/a n/a n/a n/a
1999 -1.2% 14.3% 0.8% n/a n/a n/a n/a
2000 -0.9% 15.1% 0.3% n/a n/a n/a n/a
2001 -1.1% 17.4% -1.3% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2002 25.9% 19.7% -1.9% 85.4 76.4 79.6 81.9
2003 13.4% 17.2% 9.1% 90.3 68.2 73.9 81.0
2004 4.4% 13.5% 6.6% 98.6 74.5 73.0 86.2
2005 9.6% 11.5% 3.3% 106.0 75.3 73.5 90.2
2006 10.9% 10.1% 3.4% 115.4 80.7 73.2 95.9
2007 18.3% 8.4% 1.9% 115.9 83.3 77.0 97.8
2008 27.1% 7.8% 1.5% 107.7 87.3 76.0 94.2
2009 14.6% 8.6% 0.9% 111.5 97.6 76.1 98.2
2010 23.1% 7.8% 1.4% 113.1 95.6 73.2 97.7
2011 23.4% 7.2% 2.7% 121.1 100.4 68.0 101.1
Source: My own elaboration from data provided by the National Institute of Statistics and the Census (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos / INDEC) and the Central Bank of Argentina. * From 2007 on, the inflation rate has 
been estimated using CIFRA database. n/a: not available.
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profitability and global demand.14 As an important complement, labor policies were oriented to 
regaining socio-political stability while trying to keep labor costs under control. As a result of 
these policies, the profitability of capital has remained significantly higher than during the nine-
ties: the profit rate on circulating capital for big corporations jumped from 5.9 percent in 2001 to 
14 percent in 2002, averaging 14.4 percent between 2003 and 2010.15 Meanwhile, even as real 
wages recovered slowly and unevenly, the combined impact of regained growth and a new set of 
social policies had a positive effect on the political hegemony of the political force in government 
and the state as a whole.16 From the massive repudiation of “the political” in late 2001 (Dinerstein 
2002), by early 2003 the traditional political forces – in and through the state – had regained their 
hegemony (Féliz and López 2010).17
The structural strength of this process of capital valorization and accumulation has been heav-
ily debated (Amico 2008; Curia 2007; Katz 2005; Féliz 2008). The general consensus is that the 
implied goal of macroeconomic policy has been to keep the real exchange rate devalued and 
stable (“high and stable,” according to Frenkel 2004) to provide the conditions for sustained 
investment and thus employment creation, which has been a key element in the political strategy 
for consensus building;18 with urban unemployment reaching 21.5 percent of the labor force in 
May 2002, employment creation (no matter how precarious or poorly paid) was of upmost politi-
cal importance. The new macroeconomic policy set (high real exchange rate, low real interest 
rates, fiscal surplus) created the framework for the new hegemonic fractions of capital to lead a 
renewed process of accumulation: value added in manufacturing grew at an annual rate of 8.4 
percent between 2002 and 2011, while value added in production of goods grew 7.5 percent 
annually, and in the production of services grew 7.1 percent in the same time period.
Amico (2008) proposes that, while the real exchange rate policy was important, one of the 
main novelties of the current development strategy has been the place of state-driven aggregate 
demand growth. According to him, during the ‘90s, growth was expected to come from increas-
ing direct capital profitability, mainly through economic liberalization and flexibilization of labor 
relations. On the contrary, in the current stage, growing state expenditures (especially in public 
investment and social security) and the expansion of nominal wages (under state tutelage) became 
the main thrust for aggregate demand and – through the “accelerator mechanism” – the main 
incentive for growing private investment and growth (Amico 2008). While public expenditure 
did become a significant pull for aggregate demand (Table 4; Table 5, columns 2-3), I think that 
it was the combination of the increment in profit rates together with the growth in net exports and 
sumptuary private consumption (Table 3, columns 1, 3-5) that created the main thrust for 
increased profitability and growth (Table 3, column 2; Table 1, column 2). New macroeconomic 
14Changes at the international level were also important (Arceo 2010). However, I would like to emphasize 
here the role played by local policy changes, even if many of them were successful or even possible due to 
more general changes at a regional or international scale.
15This is my own estimation based on data from the Encuesta Nacional a Grandes Empresas (ENGE, 
National Survey of Big Enterprises). Michelena (2010) and Manzanelli (2010) show, for different esti-
mates, a similar evolution in profit rates.
16While wages and employment have improved from the low levels of 2002, precarious labor and low real 
wages remain a generalized problem in Argentina (Rameri et al. 2008). For a detailed analysis of the new 
social policies in Argentina see Pérez and Féliz (2010), Dinerstein, Deledicque, and Contartese (2010), and 
Féliz (2012).
17In particular, the Peronist party (behind the new leadership of Néstor Kirchner and his wife Cristina 
Fernández) regained majority control of state institutions. Kirchner was president between 2003 and 2007 
while Cristina Fernández was elected for the period 2007-2011 and again reelected for 2011-2015. The 
Peronist party, with the leadership of neoliberal President Menem, had also ruled between 1989 and 1999.
18Curia (2007) presents the “official” argument regarding the current macroeconomic policy.
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policy allowed the unleashing of the profit potential available at a microeconomic level while, at 
the same time, displacing the macroeconomic distribution of value to create an adequate demand 
configuration based on a new structure of expenditure that was the counterpart of increased prof-
itability (basically, net exports, sumptuary consumption, and investment; Kalecki 1977).
The early relative success of the new economic strategy has allowed Argentina to take advan-
tage of the position gained by dominant capital as global supplier of food and raw materials 
(Arceo 2010). In the context of high international prices and sustained world demand, Argentina 
consolidated as an important exporter of soya derivates (from beans to oil and flour) and raw 
minerals (such as gold): in 2010 22 percent of total exports were primary commodities (food and 
minerals included), 33 percent were manufactures of agricultural products, 9 percent were petro-
leum and its derivates, and almost 1/10 of exports of industrial manufactures was related to basic 
manufactures of precious minerals. This place in the international division of labor allowed 
Argentina’s capitalist class to appropriate a sizable portion of international rent of natural 
resources. Estimations on agrarian rent put its volume at about 9.9 percent of GDP in 2004 
(Farina 2005). While, in the past, international rent tended to concentrate mainly in the agricul-
tural fractions of the dominant classes (Arceo 2003), things have changed after neoliberalism and 
neodevelopmentalism has taken advantage of it. The productive diversification of agrarian capi-
talists (Basualdo 2006; Arceo E., Basualdo, and Arceo N. 2009), concentration and centralization 
of capital, and transnationalization of production have created some sort of symbiosis between 
concentrated agrarian and industrial capitals that allows international rent to be shared between 
primary producers and producers of basic manufactures of those commodities (Basualdo 2006; 
Table 3. Selected data on capital. Argentina, 1993-2011.
Period
Profitability 




























1993 8.6% n/a 27.4% 19.1% -2.4% -2.4% 41.6%
1994 10.7% n/a 32.2% 19.9% -3.1% -1.2% 47.9%
1995 9.9% n/a 33.2% 17.9% -0.4% -1.1% 49.7%
1996 10.7% n/a 35.9% 18.1% -0.6% 0.3% 53.6%
1997 11.2% 85.5 37.1% 19.4% -2.2% -0.5% 53.8%
1998 9.5% 89.4 36.5% 19.9% -2.5% -0.9% 53.1%
1999 6.8% 88.9 36.2% 18.0% -1.7% -1.2% 51.3%
2000 7.9% 94.7 36.0% 16.2% -0.6% -1.0% 50.5%
2001 5.9% 93.7 34.8% 14.2% 1.3% -0.5% 49.7%
2002 14.0% 95.5 34.8% 12.0% 15.0% -0.7% 61.1%
2003 10.4% 100.0 35.3% 15.1% 11.2% -2.3% 59.3%
2004 13.6% 102.1 32.2% 19.2% 7.3% -3.9% 54.8%
2005 15.7% 104.8 28.9% 21.5% 5.9% -3.7% 52.6%
2006 17.2% 110.3 25.6% 23.4% 5.5% -3.5% 51.0%
2007 16.0% 114.8 26.0% 24.2% 4.3% -3.2% 51.3%
2008 12.9% 120.1 24.3% 23.3% 3.8% -3.1% 48.2%
2009 14.3% 127.9 24.9% 20.9% 5.3% -1.5% 49.7%
2010 15.1% 138.5 26.7% 22.0% 3.3% -1.7% 50.3%
2011 n/a 150.1 26.2% 22.6% 2.3% -0.3% 50.8%
Source: My own elaboration from data provided by the National Institute of Statistics and the Census (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos / INDEC) and the Central Bank of Argentina. n/a: not available.
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Féliz and López 2012).19 Besides, a high real exchange rate, together with a wide policy of trans-
port and energy subsidies (partially financed with a tax on primary exports), disperses the bene-
fits of international rent more widely (Bona 2012).
The combination of a new policy-set together with structural changes at the local and interna-
tional levels have created the setting for the strong recovery of economic growth in the first 
decade of the 21st century.
3. Barriers and Contradictions of Capitalism in Argentina
While macroeconomic performance has been quite successful in maintaining high profitability and 
facilitating economic growth, contradictions in capitalist relations of production have not ceased to 
create barriers and even limits to their expanded reproduction within the new hegemonic project.
It is well known that capital, as a social relation, has the goal of reproducing itself at an ever-
growing scale. To do so, it has to create and recreate the conditions for its valorization and accumula-
tion. However, this requires the accommodation of the needs of different fractions of capital and 
labor in a difficult and unstable path. In particular, most pressing contradictions come from the real 
social opposition between (a) capital and labor in production, (b) productive and finance capital in 
society as a whole, and (c) productive rent-appropriating capital and productive non-rentist capital.
Regarding the first contradiction, Argentina has historically shown a very strong labor move-
ment that has had the ability to successfully struggle, becoming – arguably – the most powerful 
labor movement in Latin America. The consolidation of a union system significantly integrated in 
the state in the 1940s provided workers with resources and economic and legal means for struggle 
(Féliz and Pérez 2004). Even after neoliberalism, in 2005, 37 percent of the salaried workforce in 
the private sector was affiliated with a union and almost 60 percent of big firms had union dele-
gates (MTESS 2008). In this context, the distributive struggle between capital and labor has been 
at the center of the political conflict in Argentina’s 20th century history. Since the 1970s, inflation-
ary manifestations of class conflict became rampant particularly after 1975 (Féliz and Pérez 2007). 
19According to Arceo et al. (2009) the main change in the structure of agricultural capitals is (a) the increas-
ing land renting by big landlords and (b) the increasing weight of non-land owners (such as agrarian pools) 
as producers on rented land. In the nuclear agricultural lands (pampean region), the number of hectares 
rented by landlords grew by 25 percent between 1998 and 2002 (the latest figures available) while the num-
ber of hectares rented by non-owners of land increased by 49.6 percent in the same period. The fraction of 
land under let for rent increased from 21.4 percent to 33.4 percent in that same period.
Table 4. Public expenditures. National government. Real terms, 2011 prices. Argentina, 1993-2011.
Finality and function 2003 2007 2011 2007/2003 2011/2007
Central administration 8,195 9,338 29,277 14% 214%
Defense and security 8,913 12,229 24,343 37% 99%
Social services 69,307 120,409 253,977 74% 111%
“Indirect” wages 54,713 88,347 187,818 61% 113%
Other social services 14,594 32,062 66,159 120% 106%
Economic services 10,290 34,509 101,482 235% 194%
Energy subsidies 862 14,009 50,261 1,525% 259%
Transport subsidies 2,402 15,060 39,029 527% 159%
Other economic services 7,025 5,439 12,192 -23% 124%
Public debt (interest) 13,965 24,327 41,470 74% 70%
Total expenditure 110,669 200,812 450,548 81% 124%
Source: My own elaboration from data provided by the Ministry of the Economy of Argentina.
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During the 1990s, labor conflict was contained for a while – through structural reforms and, par-
ticularly, through the convertibility of the currency, flexibilization of the labor market, and the 
legal abolition of price and wage indexation – within limits of individual enterprises thus putting 
a lid on inflationary pressures and labor conflict. After the tumultuous exit from neoliberalism, 
open labor conflict – even if within the institutional framework – became the rule again.
The contradiction between productive and finance capital had gained relevance through neolib-
eral rule, becoming a central piece in the dispute on policy and for income. During the 1980s, foreign 
debt payments created huge fiscal and foreign accounts disequilibria that translated into spiraling 
inflation since industrial fractions of capital were not willing to pay the tab, which would have 
included significant reductions in public subsidies to big capitalist corporations (Basualdo 2006). In 
the 1990s debt renegotiation created a truce between industrial and financial capital through joint 
participation in privatization of public enterprises. Eventually, the exit from convertibility in the 
early 2000s included a partial repudiation of public (and private) debt at significant (even if mainly 
formal) cost for creditors. Public debt renegotiations in 2005 and 2010 eventually settled most of the 
dispute through a significant reduction in capital and interest payments for the economy as a whole: 
the interest payments on total foreign debt fell from 4.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to 1.2 percent in 
2010.20 At the same time, big corporations were able to reduce their net interest payments on total 
debt from 5.6 percent of gross value of production in 2001 to 2.3 percent in 2010.
Finally, the contradiction between rentist and non-rentist fractions of capital has always been 
relevant to Argentinian history (Diamand 1985; Braun and Joy 1968). Traditionally, 











Investment in means 
of production (percent 
of GDP)
1993 n/a n/a 11.7% 7.3%
1994 10.0% 6.2% 11.9% 8.1%
1995 -1.7% 1.5% 11.3% 6.6%
1996 5.4% -1.2% 11.1% 7.0%
1997 8.9% 3.8% 11.6% 7.8%
1998 1.7% 5.7% 11.9% 8.0%
1999 -3.7% 4.2% 11.1% 6.9%
2000 -0.9% 0.7% 10.2% 6.0%
2001 -6.0% -2.9% 9.5% 4.7%
2002 4.5% 0.5% 7.4% 4.6%
2003 22.8% 12.4% 9.4% 5.7%
2004 18.4% 15.9% 11.3% 7.9%
2005 16.0% 27.2% 13.0% 8.5%
2006 18.4% 28.2% 14.7% 8.7%
2007 23.2% 29.3% 15.1% 9.1%
2008 25.0% 32.2% 14.5% 8.7%
2009 12.2% 25.3% 13.7% 7.2%
2010 23.9% 23.7% 13.4% 8.6%
2011 25.7% 29.6% 13.1% 9.5%
Source: My own elaboration from data provided by the National Institute of Statistics and the Census (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos / INDEC) of Argentina. n/a: not available.
20This included the full in-cash payment of Argentina’s debt with the IMF of almost 10 billion U.S. dollars 
in late 2005.
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rentist fractions of capital were big landowners that (through mostly extensive use of land for 
food production) have had control of a significant part of total exports and thus a sort of veto 
power regarding the use of foreign currency (Arceo and Schorr 2010). Besides, the economic 
pressure of rent on the real exchange rate (the so-called “curse of natural resources”) has histori-
cally been a source of struggle with industrial fractions of capital that require a higher exchange 
rate to face international competition (Diamand 1985).
These and other contradictions tend to create objectified confrontation in the form of macro-
economic disequilibria and vulnerabilities. The latter are the objectification of the particular way 
in which real confrontation between socioeconomic actors are mediated and processed. To some 
observers (Curia 2007), opting-out from neoliberalism seems to have solved many confronta-
tions since fiscal and foreign surpluses plus economic growth appeared solid in the first few years 
after 2001 (Table 1). However, the “dissolution” of historical contradictions and its effects was 
only imagined. As soon as ND was gaining some consistency, traditional conflicts began to reap-
pear in the form of growing inflation, increasing public deficit, and falling external surplus.
These tendencies (disequilibria, vulnerabilities) appear as barriers as much as they create dif-
ficulties for smooth development but they do not block valorization. All of these tendencies result 
from the contradicting effort of the different social fractions to advance in their own class objec-
tives and might be surmounted through the actions of social actors and/or public policies. Since 
barriers can be surpassed dialectically, capital accumulation can continue even at a growing 
(economic/political) cost. The dialectical overcoming of barriers implies that its negative effects 
on capital accumulation and valorization are displaced in space and time. Unless its founding 
contradiction is eliminated, the dislocation of a barrier will only be temporary. A successful hege-
monic project should be able to displace and contain its barriers within the framework created by 
its founding sociopolitical relations. If the dominant classes are not able to manage the contradic-
tions of their strategic project for any reason, barriers might turn into actual limits in some sig-
nificant dimensions of the hegemonic development project. In that case, only an organic crisis, 
supersession and reconstitution of the hegemonic alliances, will allow the constitution of a new 
sociopolitical project of development.
Neodevelopmentalism in Argentina presents several barriers that have so far been success-
fully processed, contained, or displaced.
4. Three Barriers: High Inflation, Growing Real Exchange Rate 
Appreciation, and Increasing Fiscal Deficit
First and foremost, the main problem for neodevelopmentalism has been the contradiction 
between productive capital (especially manufacturing capital) and the formal labor-force (par-
ticularly industrial workforce) for the appropriation of added value. In the first years after 2002, 
the need for growing wages was an accepted fact. It was clear to the dominant classes that the 
recuperation of conditions for the reproduction of the labor-force was a requirement for the 
recovery of political stability. After the organic crisis of neoliberalism, socio political distress 
could no longer be openly repressed; it had to be accepted and channeled in a “productive” way 
for capital.21 At the time, capital willingly (although not gladly) allowed, and the state promoted, 
increasing wages over price inflation and productivity growth in the case of formal employees 
21In the latest phase of the neoliberal rule (1990s), overt repression of social conflict was extended. However, 
after the fall of convertibility, the nature of social confrontation forced repression to become less transpar-
ent, more selective, and focalized mainly through intervention to favor political division within social orga-
nizations, judicialization of social protests, and a sort of denationalization of open repression now in the 
hands of provincial police forces and private security forces controlled by capitalist corporations (Svampa 
2008).
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(Féliz 2012: 7-8). The Ministry of Labor decreed unilateral wage increases and hikes in mini-
mum wages, which were later included in bargaining agreements. Formal labor-capital negotia-
tions that had stalled in the nineties gained momentum after 2002 for at least two main reasons. 
First, the state promoted institutionally contained agreements to keep social conflict at bay. 
Second, improving labor market conditions (particularly falling unemployment) favored the bar-
gaining power of traditional unions. The need to create an adequate social climate for investment 
and growth led dominant fractions of capital to give in to the pressures from organized labor. 
Average wages grew in real terms by 4.0 percent annually (7.8 percent for registered wage-
earners) between 2002 and 2006. However, by 2006, labor policy began to attempt to restrict 
wage growth to keep it within the limits of productivity growth (Féliz 2011b; Féliz 2012). Even 
while the government actively promoted wage caps in collective negotiations and productivity 
growth increased (as the investment rate recovered), capital’s response to higher wage demands 
was to increase inflationary pressure; actual inflation began to exceed 20 percent of the annual 
rate (Table 2, column 2).22 Real wages began to stagnate even for the more organized fractions of 
the labor movement (Table 2, columns 5-8). The result was to bring to a halt the re-composition 
in the participation of labor in income that, since 2007, has only marginally improved. However, 
while real wages have stagnated and productivity growth has picked up (Table 3, column 3), the 
inflation rate has remained in the range of 20-30 percent annually.
High and persistent inflation has given place to a second barrier. As I stated before, exchange 
rate policy has attempted to maintain a high real exchange rate to keep the competitiveness of 
local capital. In 2002, the structural real exchange rate increased 69 percent (Féliz 2007, 2009). 
Since then, however, it has been failing to keep up with higher inflation. Each individual capital 
has attempted to maintain its profitability by pushing its prices up, thus trying to devalue its wage 
costs and to improve its relative price vis-à-vis other capitals. Since the government wishes to 
control inflationary pressures, the nominal exchange rate was kept fairly stable with a slow drift 
upward. This asymmetric combination generated a tendency toward the systematic appreciation 
of the real exchange rate (Féliz 2009), and a growing loss of competitiveness of local capital vis-
à-vis foreign competitors (Table 1, column 6). This has been particularly problematic for the 
fractions of industrial capital that are not related to the manufacture of primary commodities, and 
whose ability to compete without the support of a high exchange rate is very feeble. While manu-
factures of primary products (such as food) have been able to remain competitive as a whole, the 
rest of manufacturing capital has been suffering from growing difficulties to compete interna-
tionally (Azpiazu and Schorr 2010); in 2007, the trade balance of primary and food producing 
branches had a surplus of 25 billion dollars while the balance of the rest of the economy showed 
a 15 billion deficit; in 2011, the figures showed a surplus of 42 billion to a deficit of 32 billion, 
respectively.
In the nineties, the appreciation of the real exchange rate (RER) came hand-in-hand with a 
process of increasing competitiveness – falling relative unit labor costs – of dominant manufac-
turing capitals (Féliz 2007). Contrary to that process, after 2002 RER appreciation was produced 
together with increasing relative unit labor costs (Féliz 2009). However, this contradiction has 
been moved in time and space through to the availability of surplus-value (and foreign currency) 
coming from the new super-competitive rentier (productive, non-financial) fractions of capital.
22Since 2007 the official source of inflation statistics (INDEC) was intervened by the government. The 
objective was to “tamper” with the consumer inflation record. This has put a cloud of doubt on the official 
consumer inflation rate as well as other public statistics (ATE-INDEC 2008). Since then, alternative mea-
sures produced by private sector institutions have multiplied. In my analysis from 2007 on follow the esti-
mation made by CIFRA, a research center tied to one confederation of Argentinian workers (Central de los 
Trabajadores Argentinos, CTA), and by ATE-INDEC, one union of workers at the National Statistical 
Institute.
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While domestic capital (in particular, its industrial fractions) demands state control over wage 
demands and/or to increase subsidies to capital, the organized labor movement has increased its 
own demands for income transfers through the state and for free collective bargaining. These 
included higher wage demands by state employees, and demands for increased social benefits by 
the working class. However, after the creation of the tax on exports in 2002, no significant 
changes in the tax structure created through neoliberalism have been made (Nun 2012a, 2012b). 
For that reason, the tendency to fiscal crisis has, indeed, become the third barrier of ND. Since 
2002, public expenditures have increased significantly while revenues have grown at a slower 
pace. Particularly, subsidies to capitalist corporations and expenditures on the social security 
system have had a notorious rise (Féliz and López 2012): national expenditures on economic 
services (subsidies to corporations) increased 886 percent in real terms between 2003 and 2011, 
and expenditure in social services grew 266 percent in the same period (Table 3). In order to 
maintain a fiscal surplus high enough to keep paying the interest on public debt while at the same 
time attempting to satisfy these increasing demands for public expenditure, the government has 
had to search for additional income sources. In 2008, the restatization of the pension system 
(privatized in 1993) gave the government a significant windfall income at a time when economic 
activity and fiscal income were stalling. The decision to regain state control of the pension sys-
tem came at a great cost to a fraction of financial capital (private pension funds) that was effec-
tively expropriated. This came as the necessary cost of remaining a “good debtor” regarding 
public debt without creating additional tax pressure. In early 2008, the attempt to increase fiscal 
revenue through a hike in export taxes (particularly on soya) was confronted and defeated by a 
wide alliance of a fraction of the middle classes, exporters, and producers of agricultural com-
modities (Sartelli et al. 2008). The fiscal surplus has remained positive but decreasing (Table 1, 
columns 4-5).
5. World Crisis, Domestic Calm? Displacing Contradictions in 
Time and Space
Neodevelopmentalism in Argentina has been quite successful in displacing contradictions and 
sorting out the internal barriers to its development. However, since 2007, the looming crisis in 
capitalism at a global scale has put the strength of Argentina’s neodevelopmentalist strategy to 
the test. In general terms, it appears as if domestic conditions have been able to insulate local 
accumulation from the worldwide expansion of crisis in capitalism: since 2007 economic growth 
in Argentina has averaged 6.9 percent annually until 2011 (Table 1, column 2). Thus it is particu-
larly important to analyze how has the neodevelopmentalist project deflected, absorbed, and 
displaced generalized deflationary pressures from abroad.
My hypothesis in this regard is that, with the combination of super-exploitation of labor and 
nature, neodevelopmentalism in Argentina has been able to create a cushion for surplus-value to 
stave off the impact of global crisis.
Super-exploitation of labor is a particular strategy of extraction of absolute surplus-value 
(Marini 1973). “Regular” exploitation is the result of capital’s appropriation of value produced 
by labor while paying wages that cover the social cost of reproduction of labor-power. Super-
exploitation implies paying wages that are below the cost of reproduction, and thus create a 
source of extraordinary profitability (Marini 1973). When such a process becomes generalized 
for a significant fraction of the labor-force, it can be said to become a relevant force in accumula-
tion and expanded reproduction of capital. I extend this idea to the use of natural products in an 
exploitative, non-sustainable way that has become standard practice in today’s capitalism (see, 
for example, Harvey 2005; Svampa and Sola Álvarez 2010). This process does not conceptually 
imply strategies of absolute surplus-value extraction (as in the case of labor super-exploitation) 
but involves the production and appropriation of substantial amounts of so-called ground-rent, 
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producing additional incentives for accelerated exploitation. Historically, this rent has been 
found to be a major source of profitability for capital in Argentina (Iñigo Carrera 2007).
In Argentina, the process of successful capitalist accumulation that began in mid-2002 com-
bined low levels of fixed investment with high intensity in the use of living labor: fixed invest-
ment on means of production averaged 8.0 percent between 2003 and 2007 (only slightly higher 
than during 1993-1998) while employment grew by 4.9 percent yearly on average during the 
same period (compared with 1.3 percent between 1993-1998). After successful devaluation of 
capital in early 2002, higher exploitation and profitability gave thrust to a process of valorization 
based on the extensive appropriation of labor or intensive use of absolute surplus-value. This 
allowed for limited increase in the organic composition of capital and thus displaced in time its 
inner crisis tendencies: between 2002 and 2006 total employment grew by 24.2 percent while net 
real capital stock only grew by 9.9 percent in the same period (ARKLEMS+LAND 3.0 2012).23 
Higher profitability of capital has been maintained by the increasing appropriation of living labor 
through the use of precarious super-exploited employment: in 2010, 35.2 percent of all salaried 
workers (and over 50 percent of all salaried workers in the private sector) were employed in 
precarious conditions (with no social security benefits).24 This situation turns into an evident 
form of super-exploitation: in 2009, 42.3 percent of workers were paid wages below the mini-
mum wage (in 2003 this count reached 32 percent of workers).25 In an analogous form, the exis-
tence of rent-appropriating capitals has created a significant mass of excess surplus-value in the 
current decade. According to Arceo and Rodriguez (2006), the volume of agrarian rent jumped 
700 percent, from 1,288 million constant pesos to 9,022 million between the 1991-2001 period 
and the 2002-2004 period. It has grown even further in the following years as the extension of 
rent-accruing production has increased (Giarraca and Teubal 2010; Colectivo Voces de Alerta 
2011). The land used for Argentina’s main agricultural products (i.e. soya, wheat, corn) went 
from 27 million hectares in 1995-2004 to 34.5 million in 2010/2011, while production jumped 
from 65 million tons to 104 million tons in the same time span (López 2012). At the same time, 
the number of mining projects jumped from 18 in 2002 to 614 in 2011, and investment in mining 
went from 541 million dollars in 2002 to 11 billion in 2011 (Secretaría de Minería 2012).
As we stated before, the neoliberal stage allowed for the consolidation of capitals in the produc-
tion of primary commodities (such as soybeans and minerals). These sectors were able to take 
advantage of the change in relative prices in favor of primary products that consolidated in the past 
ten years across the world economy.26 The combination of new technological advances and higher 
demand by China, India, Brazil, and other economies in the Global South, together with specula-
tion in derivative markets, gave local capitals in Argentina’s export sectors the opportunity of 
taking advantage of its lower absolute costs (Arceo et al. 2009).27 The resulting rent has been 
channeled through direct control by economic groups or through export taxation and public redis-
tribution in the form of subsidies, mainly to favor the top players in each branch of the 
economy.28
23From 2006 to 2010, net capital stock grew only 0.2 percent in real terms (ARKLEMS+LAND 3.0 2012). 
There is no current official information available on capital stock. During the 1990s, growth in organic 
composition of capital appears as one of the fundamental causes of the crisis (Féliz 2007, 2009, 2011).
24See Féliz, López, and Fernández (2012). Precariousness of employment includes much more than just the 
absence of social security benefits.
25Marini (1978) uses minimum wages as an empirical limit for super-exploitation of labor.
26This means that the structural transformation of Argentina’s capitalist insertion in the cycle of world capi-
tal is previous to the commodity prices boom (2007/2008). This boom has provided an extra boost to 
Argentina’s growth but in no way is the main source of growing profitability. See Arceo et al. (2009).
27Exports to Brazil, China, and India represent 31.6 percent of total exports of Argentina in 2010 (only 24.9 
percent in 2002). Imports from those countries rose from 32.7 percent in 2002 to 45.8 percent in 2010.
28Data from the ENGE suggest that direct subsidies to big corporations amounted to 17.6 percent of their 
profits in 2010, up from 10.1 percent in 2003.
 by guest on February 6, 2015rrp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
84 Review of Radical Political Economics 47(1)
Besides, debt restructuring allowed for debt and interest payments to be reduced and changed 
in their form. Public debt fell to 48.8 percent of GDP in 2008 from 166.4 percent in 2002 while at 
the same time its structure changed: foreign public debt went down from 57.3 percent of total 
public debt in 2002 to only 38.2 percent in 2008. At the same time, the exchange rate policy was 
successful enough to maintain a significant surplus in the current account of the balance of pay-
ments, thus helping the state accumulate a sizable amount of foreign currency in the Central Bank.
As the world economy – particularly in core capitalist countries – began to face its first downturn 
(2007-2009) in this century, the Argentinian economy was well furnished to take the blow: in 2007, 
international reserves topped 15.7 percent of GDP (from only 9.5 percent in 2003), the current 
account result was a surplus of 2.8 percent of GDP (down from 6.4 percent in 2003), and the 
national government’s primary fiscal surplus was 3.2 percent of GDP (up from 2.3 percent in 2003). 
As exports began to fall in late 2008, industrial production stalled. The impact of world crisis 
reflected in falling international reserves (Table 1, column 7) and a significant deterioration in the 
(already fragile) fiscal surplus. However, capital profitability was only slightly affected. After fall-
ing in 2008, the profit rate on circulating capital for big companies recovered in 2009 and 2010.
For the first time in many years, recession was not accompanied by nationwide conflict and 
crisis in the main macroeconomic balances (fiscal and balance of payments).29 The government 
took advantage of the space provided by the structural balances, moving forward with some 
policy actions that were able to contain possible political conflicts (Pérez and Féliz 2010). First, 
it activated an existing but mostly unused program of subsidies for companies in distress called 
Programa de Recuperación Productiva (Program of Productive Recovery, REPRO, created in 
2002) that permitted the government to subsidize the wage toll of almost 200,000 employees of 
big and medium sized corporations. This allowed companies to suspend workers – instead of fir-
ing them – and avoided a sizable political conflict. As stated, big corporations concentrate most 
union affiliates and shop-floor delegates so controlling conflict through state policies during the 
downturn was very important. Second, in late 2009, the government created a new social pro-
gram that unified most existing social programs and extended their coverage. The Asignación 
Universal por Hijo (Universal Child Allowance) gave income support to almost 4 million chil-
dren in 1.5 million families. Finally, in 2009, the creation of the Plan Argentina Trabaja 
(Argentina Works Program), consisting of about 100,000 jobs in cooperatives, allowed the gov-
ernment to relieve the political pressure that social organizations – with origin in the Piquetero 
movement born in the 1990s – were putting on the streets.
As the world economy recovered in late 2009, the Argentinian economy began to grow again 
at a strong pace. However, as I explained, the contradictions and barriers of neodevelopmental-
ism grew higher. Inflation continued to erode the competitive edge of domestic capital and the 
current account surplus kept decreasing. Growing demands on public expenditure began to bring 
doubts as to the sustainability of primary surplus (indispensable to clear interest payments on 
public debt). The government had to get hold of new sources of finance and began to adjust its 
policies regarding subsidies and the exchange rate. In 2009, the government began a process of 
softening the Central Bank’s limitations for financing state expenditures. The creation of the 
Fondo de Desendeudamiento (Debt Reduction Fund) and the modification of the organic charter 
of the Central Bank (CB) in early 2012, has given the state greater access to finance from the CB. 
In late 2011, after Cristina Kirchner won the election for a second presidential term, a process of 
“fine tuning” (as was dubbed by the president herself) initiated an attempt to curb increasing bar-
riers. Tariffs on public services and subsidies, mostly frozen since 2002, began a progressive 
adjustment; the nominal exchange rate was pushed on a slow drift upward, and wage 
29The exception was the mentioned conflict with soya exporters and producers. This was the most important 
political conflict of national significance since 2002. The impact was so important that the government 
decided to move up the parliamentary elections to June 2009 (programmed for October 2009), elections that 
they eventually lost.
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containment policy was hardened. At the same time, in early 2012, steps were taken to control 
foreign exchange markets with the creation of a series of requisites and cross checks that effec-
tively reduced foreign currency drain (“capital flight”). These contractive measures were con-
fronted with attempts to increase public expenditure through growing BC finance for direct 
outlays or indirect ones through soft credit.
In this context, as the international crisis in capitalism takes the global economy on a new 
downturn in 2012, Argentina seems more fragile than on the previous occasion. GDP annual 
growth in October 2012 was only 2.7 percent, with construction falling 5.3 percent by November 
2012 (compared with the previous year), and industrial production dropping 1.4 percent during 
the 12 months to November 2012. The “fine tuning,” a form of heterodox adjustment, has had 
significant costs in terms of inflation and employment. Even as growth has slowed and 112,000 
salaried jobs have been lost (in the year ending in the 2nd trimester of 2012, according to Instituto 
IPYPP 2012), inflation has remained over 20 percent annually.
While, during the prior round, Argentina’s government was able to avoid significant devalua-
tion of capital through an expansionary policy, it might not be possible this time. Increasing 
expenditures is now very much limited in its possibilities and effects by the need to contain limit-
ing barriers and renewed social confrontation.
6. Preliminary Conclusions
Neodevelopmentalism in Argentina has come to represent the new project of dominant classes after 
neoliberalism. However, as a capitalist process, it produces and reproduces contradictions, barriers, 
and limits. These social contradictions were the dynamic forces behind most pressing barriers to 
smooth, successful valorization. Steadily high domestic inflation, pressing demands on fiscal surplus, 
and falling exchange rate competitiveness became growing difficulties for continuing expansion.
So far, the dominant classes have been able to displace them by timely policy measures. 
Inflationary rise was put under some control by political control over unions. Fiscal deterioration 
has been temporarily put off by state appropriation of new income sources. These sources are disap-
pearing because they were a one-time opportunity (i.e. restatization of social security) or because 
they are limited (such as borrowing by the Central Bank). Finally, manufacturing competitiveness 
has been propped up by sporadic nominal devaluations of the exchange rate and subsidies.
The temporary overcoming of these barriers has allowed continuous growth and political sup-
port. As employment (even if precarious) and economic growth continue, the so-called “serious” 
capitalism will continue to be supported by the general public.30 The local capitalist class has a 
genuine interest in the continuation of this process. Neodevelopmentalism represents transnational 
capital with a base in Argentina and, as such, the mentioned barriers do not constitute a limit to its 
expansion so far. The “national-popular” project has built a substantial socio political support base.
However, limits to neodevelopmentalism seem to be setting in. Lagging competitiveness is 
the combination of dependent participation in the world markets and insufficient investment. The 
preeminence of the export-based rent-appropriating sector within the capitalist class is the mirror 
image of the dependent relation with Brazil and China. Successful accumulation is reliant on 
permanence of expansion in the Global South, something that is being brought into question as 
crisis in Northern capitalism spirals. On the other hand, stagnation of major trade partners, such 
as the mentioned Brazil and China, is already taking its toll on economic growth and thus on 
political hegemony. As a new recessionary wave hits Argentina’s capitalism (“armored” against 
foreign and domestic shocks), political agitation and social unrest will put the ability of the 
neodevelopmentalist strategy to the test again.
30See Cristina Fernández’s speech in this regard (Presidencia de la Nación, 3/11/2011).
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